Moral feelings or moral law?
What is morality?
Is it a personal feeling?
Is it something beyond human opinion?
I believe debates with atheists are limited by our disagreement on the nature of morality.
Most atheists believe morals are just a kind of personal opinion. You have your morals and I might have a contradictory set of morals. In the end it's just our feelings.
We believe morality is a part of the essence of God, unchanging and objective. Our feelings aren't morals. They're just an imperfect reflection of morality.
The materialistic worldview depicts morality as personal feelings (caused by experiences), biological adaptations (via evolution) and societal quirks. Mere arbitrary concepts with no meaning beyond the human animal.
As children we're often taught it's important to do what's right. Now why is that? Is it pure selfishness. Ae we just avoiding punishment or trying to be liked by others?
Typically children begin by learning morals in a selfish way (avoiding punishment, gaining rewards) however typically they begin to think acts are wrong or right whether there's a punishment or not.
In materialist philosophy this can be seen as a biological or societal quirk that tricks us into imagining our grand opinions were reality. Children tend to believe that it really is wrong to murder, not that they just disapprove of it.
Atheist's moral relativism can poison discussions.
Atheists will occasionally say that if God existed He would be evil. Christians typically think the Atheist is making a claim about reality.
What we usually miss is that the Atheist is merely giving their opinion. They aren't saying that evil actually exists and God would qualify. What they're saying is:
"Boo, Boo, I hate the idea of God"
It's akin to a sports fan jeering the opposing team.
When we realize this we can give appropriate weight to moral claims atheists make.
However I believe our lack of common ground on morality limits the usefulness of Christians and atheists debating.
In my next post I'm going to attempt to show how debates are limited before we even begin them.
15 comments:
You appear to be making the assumption that there must be a God for there to be moral truths.
But, strangely enough, you have provided no actual argument for your assertion of a logical connection between the following statements:
1. God's nature is X.
2. One ought to behave in a way consistent with X.
Moreover, on the reasoning that claims (2) follows from (1), it follows that if X in statement (1) is "cruel and sadistic" then one ought to be cruel and sadistic.
That would make morality arbitrary.
So, if there is such a thing as moral truths (and I agree that there are), then we are going to need another meta-ethical theory than the one you propose---and, I point out again, have yet to present an actual argument for. Despite its having serious problems like the one I propose above.
To elaborate:
Is it better that X in the 2 statements above be "loving and caring" rather than "cruel and sadistic"?
If so, then there is a standard independent of God's nature.
If not, morality is arbitrary.
It appears that you're on the horns of a particularly nasty dilemma defending the meta-ethical theory you propose.
If you find God arbitrary than you have nothing less arbitrary to grab onto for moral truth because everything else exists based on his character.
My feelings haven't got a thing to do with moral reality.
At this point I believe you still have a fundamental misunderstand of the Christian doctrine of God's aseity.
Your proposition that God could have a different nature is logically impossible because God is aseitic.
Aseity solves old Euthyphro's dilemma.
Do you deny that a being with the usual characteristics attributed to God (omnipotent, omniscient, being a spirit, having created the universe) but with a cruel and sadistic character rather than a loving and caring one is logically possible?
If so, please present an actual argument to that effect.
Also, define aseity as you are using it. I can think of more than one way the statement "God is aseitic" can be interpreted.
Only when you explain your usage can real discussion of the claim become possible.
For example, one possible interpretation of the claim you make is that it is logically necessary that God exist and that he have a loving character---if so, please present an argument to that effect.
But if you mean by aseitic something else please explain (and actually argue for) your position.
It is not logically possible for God to be different.
Let's look at why.
1) What is the basis for hypothetical thinking?
An event is contingent on other events and could have occurred differently.
2) Do the requirements for hypothetical thinking apply to God?
No, God is uncaused and predates all events. As He simply exists absent any cause there's no way He couldn't exist.
I'm not sure whether you're missing my point because you don't realize the requirements for hypothetical thinking or because you've got such a tiny god.
You apparently do not know what the term "logically possible" means. Any proposition which is not internally contradictory is logically possible.
Is it logically possible that there exists a Spirit which created the universe and is omnipotent and omniscient but about whose character you are mistaken---who is cruel and sadistic rather than loving and caring?
Obviously, yes. By the very definition of the term "logical possibility"---the only things which are logically impossible are self contradictory statements like "2+2=5" and "that unmarried man has a wife".
So, if you are using the statement "God is aseitic" to mean "it is not logically possible for God to not exist nor for him to exist but to have a character that is not loving" then your statement is obviously false---since there is nothing internally contradictory about those propositions.
David:
So, if you are using the statement "God is aseitic" to mean "it is not logically possible for God to not exist nor for him to exist but to have a character that is not loving" then your statement is obviously false---since there is nothing internally contradictory about those propositions.
The internal contradiction comes into play only when you have a good understanding of the description of God. I think this confirms your definition of God is the source of your misunderstanding.
The problem here is your misunderstanding of the definition of "logically possible" and "logically impossible".
You are defining God as logically impossible not to exist---however, that definition itself includes an internal contradiction (it contradicts the definition of logically impossible) and is therefore necessarily false---a logical impossibility.
Just because you define God as aseitic (logically impossible not to exist) does not make the proposition logically possible to be true. And, in fact, it isn't.
However, you are free to refine your definition of "aseitic" to mean God's existence is necessarily true in some other sense than logically necessary.
I have debated online one theology student, for example, who argued that God's existence is not logically necessary but IS ontologically necessary.
Not that he made any actual case for that claim---but at least it has the advantage of not being internally contradictory and therefore not being a logical impossibility.
I'm going to point out that I haven't defined "God as logically impossible not to exist" at any point in our discussion. That was your straw man.
My statement was that it isn't logically possible for God to be different in nature and remain God.
That is based upon the Christian understanding of what God is. I think it's beyond tautology but take it that way if you must. I'm not capable of summarizing that understanding in a non-reductionist way.
This discussion appears to have taken a snide turn, my participation will resume when that tone is absent.
I'm going to point out that I haven't defined "God as logically impossible not to exist" at any point in our discussion. That was your straw man.
I specifically pointed out that your statement that "God is aseitic" was open to different interpretations (this term usually refers to the necessity of the existence of God). And I invited you to clarify your statement and to correct me if the interpretation of it as "logically impossible not to exist and not to have a loving character" was incorrect. If you meant only the that second part was what you intended you could have said so long before now.
My statement was that it isn't logically possible for God to be different in nature and remain God.
Thanks for the clarification. Your position brings up some fascinating questions (I'll ignore that not calling a being God who has all the characteristics of the christian God except his loving nature is simply a semantic issue---its where and why and if this difference makes a substantive difference to the question of the basis of morality that matters):
if there were no God but there WERE a being with all God's characteristics (being a spirit, omnipotent, omniscient, having created the universe) except having a different character then would this beings character be the basis for moral truths?
If not, why not?
Why must only a being of those characteristics but with a loving nature be the basis for morality?
This position you are taking, I think, skirts very close to endorsing my own meta-ethical theory (that love is of intrinsic value, in and of itself, by its very nature).
Another question:
If God, as you define him, did not exist but a being with all his characteristics (as described above) except lovingness DID exist, why would this being not be worthy of worship? Why is it a being we would otherwise describe as God not be worthy of worship if he did not have a loving nature?
I think its unlikely that there's a coherent way to defend the position that a being of all God's characteristics but his loving nature should not be worshipped unless you endorse my position on meta-ethics that love is, of its nature, intrinsically worthwhile.
The characteristics you describe aren't adequate for a description of God.
This comes from several Biblical understandings.
1) God is perfect in his nature.
2) The sense in which he is perfect isn't comprehensible but the Bible does assert that God's nature is perfect, not merely good.
Since God predates all of existence, God must be perfect in an internal but singular way.
A being with immense power and an evil nature is logically possible but this being wouldn't be internally perfect.
I'd also mention that God's internal perfection (at the least an incomprehensible sort of consistency) would still render Him the origin of morality even if striped of all of his power.
My understanding of the trinity involves an understanding that Christ was neither omniscient, omnipotent nor omnipresent but still possessed the nature of God and was God.
You're evaluating perfect by some other moral standard which does not come from God. What you're really saying is, it's logically possible but it's not consistent with MY concept of morality X.
If God is perfect because the Bible says He is perfect, isn't the Bible conferring (and thus knows all the standards of) perfection on God? Isn't the Bible then the final moral authority, not God?
Unless you can accept that any God (regardless of its ethical views) is the God you would emulate, you cannot keep evaluating him by some other standard. Then, the standard is perfect, and God is second-rate because it is no longer the first standard (the Bible is, in this case).
The Bible evaluates God by his own standards. Obviously an outside standard would be impossible since all things come from God and are maintained by Him.
A Universe must be created for objective moral standards to have meaning.
No moral standards can exist without context.
In a way hat we can't fully understand God's nature is the only manner in which a being can be entirely consistent.
Your desire to draw out external standards for a Christian is irrational because even if I thought those standards existed they would simply be elements created by God. Moral standards simply don't have meaning unless there is already a reality for them to operate in. The only reality before creation was God. If Moral standards have an origin they can only have meaning in Him.
I think each of us have stated our points here.
If you have something to add feel free but I'm not going to attempt to engage in persuasion.
I've likely expressed my views to the best of my limited ability and I'm not particularly interested in defending them to someone who can't benefit from them.
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